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28/11/2007 尽职调查The Due Diligence Dipsey Doodleby Rick Segal Ahh, Due Diligence. A happy process where people sit around in comfy chairs, casually talking about business metrics, laughingly reviewing a few spreadsheets done in VisiCalc, and enjoying a friendly barb or two about the felony convictions for misappropriation of Government funds. There is nothing more relaxing for entrepreneurs to do then spend weeks of time making Venture Capitalists risks go down. Or something like that. Truth be told, Due Diligence is like a root canal from a really bad dentist who uses diluted Romulan Ale for Novocain and Silly Putty for filling material. It's a very painful process. Here some things you might consider when embarking on your start up routine. Day one:
Now these three simple things sound almost silly but they are the foundation of everything moving forward. The cleaner your books are, the more documentation you have, the tighter the corporate paperwork is, the better/faster you will get financing under the assumption, of course, the idea has merit. Angels, like VCs, put a high value on organized material because it shows smart, organized people. One less problem to have in our collective judgement. In more detail, here are some hot buttons to think about: Financial Forecasts Pre-revenue this is a pile of forecasts, I understand that. When you are doing those forecasts, the number one thing that actually matters arethe assumptions behind them. How many per hour, how much per byte, how many hours in a cycle, how big, how fast, how far, how many. That first sheet is the list of every metric and assumption that anyone could reasonably want to track/measure the business on. From these metrics, you build up your forecast. Behind the assumptions, you will try to get any market data you can that backs up what you assume. So if you assume 20 customers a day and the potential market is 12 billion people as shown by this and that report, okay. If you claim a 1,000 customer sign ups per hour based on your gut and the fact that the guys in the office just love it, not okay. Don't laugh, this happens all the time:
As I said, happens all the time. Cash Flow Simply put, how long is the money going to last. Really. It is not that difficult and there is no hidden agenda with the cash flow question. Using a set of assumptions (see above) and projecting expenses against those assumptions, deducting the revenue you anticipate, gets you how much cash is needed. If you are not raising at or more than you need, the cash flow statement will tell you how long this raise is going to last. We want to know that and you should be tracking this. Budget to Actual From the day you start, do forecasts and track your progress against these forecasts. If you expected to have a beta done in one month with two programmers at 10 grand a month and then come in at 40 days, excellent, you are ahead of schedule and under budget. If you are over by a week, okay, you are over. The more important point will be that you are tracking all of this with trends being seen and surprises kept to a minimum. With a start up, much of the angel's investment and the VC (who does start ups) thesis is based on assumptions, gut feelings, marketing conditions, and a host of other irrational things I can't think of right now. The more grounded your presentation is; the more real data you have, the better you will be in getting this off the 'gut feel' list and onto the 'real business' list. Being on the gut feel list means that a bad hair day, spooky news story, wonky stock market, all can impact the person's gut. Real businesses usually get evaluated as just that; real businesses. Business Thesis and Assumptions To believe in SIRIT (one of my portfolio companies), you have to believe in RFID technology, growth of near field communications, more and more tolling and metered HOV lanes, etc. I do and hence we are in the company. You have to believe in blogs as a window into the next form of one to many communications with an amazing feedback/community aspect to them. You have to believe in a revenue stream that will rival today's media revenues and you have to believe in the continuing growth of quality over crap. I do; hence my b5 investment. For you, what do I have to believe? What do you believe? And, of course, what are the assumptions behind those beliefs. For example, in the case of b5, the rise in blog creation doesn't tell the real blog story, per se. What's important is the rise of readership, ad dollars, and the mainstream guys switching to 'blogs' (or daily dosage content) in order to grow a core readership base. Guys like CNN's Anderson Cooper has a blog. Is he/CNN doing it for fun? I suspect not. Business Week's team, The New York Times, etc, all have blogs as a part of the offering. All have increasing readership and when you combine this with the numbers b5 puts out, you can make a reasonable assumption on some metrics and place the bets accordingly. You have to have the same story, metrics, thesis, etc, from day one. My partner, Stuart Lombard, felt the call to do another start up. When he raised apital in addition to our (JLA) money, his opening pitch started with a slide that said if you don't believe in these 6 things, stop now, we're done. If you make that pitch with that slide, you might get better feedback even in the no meetings because you can have a very pointed discussion on specific business points. Just disclose it. We're going to find out. We do background checks and real/paid reference reviews. We will know about jail time, know about bankruptcy, know you got fired despite the "pursue other options" nonsense so fess up. Speaking for myself, I have no problem with somebody that is passionate, head strong with a great idea that got tossed from a company because she didn't get along with the founder. It happens. It has happened to me. I got fired before and everybody made nice nice but I got fired. I lived and so can you. If you are going to miss your numbers, tell me now. If the CTO is going to be leaving, tell me now. Disclose it all because this investment gig is based on mutual trust. A fairly weird VC guy I know sits in meetings a listens to an entrepreneur's pitch without saying much or asking many questions. At the end, he almost always says, okay, thanks, now tell me everything I'm going to find out when I do due diligence. While his style is questionable, the point is valid. Fess up early and often. Document Everything. Did I mention that documenting everything is huge? Good, I'm mentioning it again. Save a Tree, Buy a Scanner Scan the documents, give them friendly names, store them on a server and you have 90% of your Due Diligence problems solved. If you review the DD checklists from me or any other VC, you can get a head start today with keeping materials ready to go and available for review. Simple and cheap. And here is a free tip for you on this scanner topic. If your VC says he can only accept a 3 ring binder with all the materials organized by tabs, numbered, etc, and with two sets of binders? You've got trouble brewing before the game starts. To have you waste time like that as well as money should tell you something. Yes, I'd like the stuff in handy binders as well (and ask) but if I get in in electronic format, I'm good and I appreciate the efficiency of it all. Expect Hard Questions I've got three signed terms sheets right now. I'd like to close all of them. So far, the due diligence on one is a disaster, two hasn't shown up yet and one is not meeting the minimal expectations like being able to open the spreadsheet. Part of the process is conversations to dig into the business and match the dig results to the basic business thesis. I know somebody is going to be pissed off at me if we don't close because all three have term sheets. Doesn't matter if it is $500k or $5mm, for us the DD is all the same. The hard questions tend to be go something like these:
When you get defensive, exasperated, bugged, pissed off, etc, because I'm digging into everything you've presented to me, that's a red flag. The simple message, folks, is to lay out 'facts' with material to back em up. Really. It isn't more complex. If you say, Bill Gates loved it, I will call em. If you say Eric Schmidt wanted to buy you on the spot, I will call em. If you say you are getting 40 million page views a day, I will look and verify it. Most of the questions come as a direct reaction to the materials and data you present. Line Up the Calls. Customer calls. Client calls. Partner calls. Reference calls. Expect most of these people to get calls from your investor. Line em up, folks. I can't tell you how many times the process breaks down because we are waiting on call backs, call information, etc. We are not the bottleneck, the process is. This part is brutal so do what you can to line up the calls. Release the Hounds! Tell your team that everything is an open book. Let everybody know to hide nothing and use good judgement in answering questions. In a company of less than 20 people, I talk to everybody. That's my personal thing, may not be everybody's. I can tell via the body language if there has been a massive brief on how to deal with the VC and, trust me, they aren't as loyal as you think. People will tell the truth so you might as well set the tone up front. Just that one more thing..... Hopefully, I've given you some food for thought on this whole due diligence cha cha. It can be a royal pain but if you do some up front homework, you can lessen the pain significantly. Now, there's just these forms you need to fill out in triplicate with the backs signed in blue pen on top a number 2 pencil signature from your sister's nephew's uncle on your Mother's side. It's always one more thing. 26/11/2007 签署Term Sheet前要做多少尽职调查
How much diligence should we do before signing a term sheet?by Venture Hacks
Summary: Signing a term sheet takes you off the market. Before you sign a term sheet, complete business diligence and prepare for legal diligence. Finally, desperation is the worst reason to rush into a term sheet. A reader asks:
Whether or not your term sheet includes this term, complete business diligence and prepare for legal diligence before you sign a term sheet. Signing a term sheet early is dangerous.Signing a term sheet, with or without a no-shop agreement, while an investor is still conducting business diligence is a recipe for a hostage negotiation:
While you've been off the market, your prospective investors have been creating alternatives by looking at other companies. Every company that is raising money, not just your competitors in the marketplace, is competing for your prospective investor’s time and money. Meanwhile, the market your created before signing a term sheet has dissipated. Even if you turn down these (worse) terms and approach new investors, you will have to explain why you walked away from a signed term sheet. So, before you sign a term sheet, complete business diligence and prepare for legal diligence. Complete business diligence.Business diligence is whatever your investor does to make his investment decision. Some firms complete business diligence before they offer a term sheet. Other firms offer term sheets before they complete business diligence because they want to lock out the competition while they evaluate the company. Determine whether business diligence is complete by asking:
Prepare for legal diligence.After you sign a term sheet, investors conduct legal diligence, looking for reasons to not invest or reasons to revise the terms. Legal diligence,
Before you sign a term sheet, help your prospective investor eliminate most reasons not to invest by,
Desperation is no reason to rush into a term sheet.You: "It must be great to complete diligence before you sign a term sheet but we're desperate for money right now." Venture Hacks Shift Manager: That's the worst reason to rush into a term sheet. Signing a term sheet before completing business diligence makes you more desperate, not less. A term sheet with or without a no-shop takes you off the market, dissipates your market, and places you at the mercy of your prospective investor. 23/11/2007 融资时常犯的5大错误,以及如何避免The Top Five Mistakes in Raising Capital and How to Avoid Them
You've done your research, you've got your business plan written, and you're excited about your ideas. Now it is time to raise capital. What now? If you are like most entrepreneurs, when it is time to secure your start-up capital, you want to make the most of your time and resources. There is little time for mistakes.
Aside from your personal funds and borrowing from friends and family, there are numerous routes you can take – each with its advantages and disadvantages. The interest rates you incur from a bank loan can be enough to turn a business sideways, if you even have the opportunity for a bank loan. Most startups don't qualify. Relying on family and friends alone to financially support your endeavor can spawn severe consequences.
Seeking out seasoned and compatible investors, whether it is angel investors or venture capitalists, will not only provide you with the capital you need, but also the business guidance and contacts that can help you along the way. No matter what route you choose, there are red flags along the way that can cost your business its success.
Avoid these top five mistakes in raising capital, and you will save yourself time, effort, and a headache.
1. You underestimated the time and effort of raising capital.
Funding won't come overnight. When seeking out potential investors you may be turned away more than you have braced yourself for. While you may think that your business is guaranteed to be the next Microsoft or Google, chances are it is going to take time and effort to prove that to someone else. Don't be discouraged if the funding process takes you longer than expected. Finding the right investors to commit to your business may take patience, but in the end it will be invaluable to the future of your business. You should plan on spending at least three months and realistically six to ten months to acquire all of your funding.
2. You didn't write a check to yourself.
Start proving yourself and your concept from the get-go. If you aren't willing to invest in your own company, how will you prove to potential investors that your company is worthy of their money? Not only will your previous personal investment instill confidence in the potential shareholder, it will also prove that you are willing to make some early mistakes on your nickel, rather than theirs.
3. You signed on the wrong early investors.
A natural starting point for most entrepreneurs is to seek capital through friends and family. It may be easy for you to gain the much needed support from these people; however, most likely they aren't accredited investors, and this may make many accredited investors run from the deal. Money from a seasoned investor is more valuable than money from an inexperienced family member.
If you do have to get capital from family, have it well documented. We've seen the "Uncle Bob" type who thinks the money is a loan when the business is going bad and it's equity when it is going great.
Choose your early investors wisely, and your patience will pay off in the end.
4. You overvalued your opportunity
It is better to have 50 percent of something than 100 percent of nothing. A few entrepreneurs will hold out for a higher valuation and their company runs out of money. Move forward with the early evaluation to continue receiving funding.
5. You were your own business partner.
For real estate investors the rule is "location, location, location." For angel investors, it is "management, management, management." Two heads are better than one – especially if one of those heads is an experienced executive. Finding someone with the resources, contacts and business understanding is key when persuading investors to buy into your company. Investors appreciate experienced management more than any other characteristic when assessing a company's potential. If you want someone to give you money, find a business partner with executive credibility and experience. 早期公司的董事会席位Early Stage Board of Directorsby Dick Costolo I've had a few questions recently from folks who have received first round financing term sheets in which the proposed board makeup seems over the top, from my perspective. Here is a composite (sorry, "mashup") of the kind of first round term sheet language for Board participation I recently heard from different founders: One CEO seat (currently founder X), two Series A investor seats, and and independent nominated by the Series A and approved by the board. This is silly. A more cynical wizard (who would look like me but say "hmm" a lot more) might interpret this as early investors trying to take control of the company immediately. Can you spot the three things we don’t like about this proposed board structure? First, "one CEO seat (currently founder X)". That's nice, founder X gets a board seat. How long does founder X have a board seat? Only as long as (s)he is the CEO. New CEO, new board member and out with founder X. No more founder board seats. Let's move on to the other troubles before we re-draft the entire proposal. Problemo numero dos, "Two Series A seats". Um, I don't get why the first round investors should get two seats. If the Series A is all being done by one institution, then this is particularly annoying, but even in the case of a syndicate, the series A investors should have a single representative on the board. "But but but", you say. "Wait wait wait", you say. “"What if you really appreciate the input of two particular members of a syndicated financing?" Excellent point; the proposed board structure might include a board seat for the lead investor on the round, and board observation rights for one or more members of the syndicate. Finally, and particularly the way this proposed board is structured, watch out for the wording on "an independent seat nominated by the Series A and approved by the board." In this case, the Series A investor obviously controls the independent seat completely. This entrepreneur’s post-A round board, if accepted, is going to have 3 people representing the Series A and one CEO, who may or may not be the founder six months from now. This is, in legal parlance, "sucky". If this is one investor doing the round, note that we might also raise our eyebrows and wonder why the institution's partners have so much free time that two of them can take board seats in the same company. Here's a more straightforward Series A board structure: "One founder seat, one Series A seat, and an independent nominated by the founder and approved by unanimous consent of the board". If you're a multi-founder company, then I might change this to: "One founder seat (founder X), one CEO seat (currently held by founder Y), one Series A seat, and one independent nominated by the CEO and approved by unanimous consent of the board". Frankly, you could keep it even more basic in the latter multi-founder case and just go with founder/founder & ceo/series A, but I personally enjoyed having an independent board member once we'd added one ourselves, and I think it's helpful to get this person in sooner rather than later. In the multi-founder case, when you do a 2nd round financing and you can keep the same general structure, you still have a nicely balanced board: something like two people from founder/management, two investors, and an independent. From here you can do things like layer in more independents as you grow, etc. Rational investors are comfortable with these sorts of structures, and in fact, in our series B negotiation at FeedBurner, it was the investors who countered with "founder seat and ceo seat currently held by founder" when we originally redlined the first term sheet with two founder seats. This is a perfectly reasonable compromise in most cases and provides the investors with some security that a "renegade founder group" can't hold management and investors hostage, while giving a strong founder group some assurance they will have significant and balanced participation in the board. There is no reason a founder should feel obligated to cede control of the company to a single investor on an early financing. 21/11/2007 我否决后不要让我推荐Don't Ask For A Referral If I Say Noby Brad Feld Fred Wilson wrote an excellent post last month titled Saying No. I thought of it today when I found myself tangled up an in email exchange with someone I said no to. I won't repeat what Fred said (his post is worth reading) but I'll add to it. I get tons of inbound email from entrepreneurs (and bankers, and lawyers) pitching new investments. I take a look at all of them and always try to respond within a day. I say no to many of them, but I'm happy to be on the receiving end of them (and encourage you – dear reader – to send me stuff anytime.) When I say no, I try to do it quickly and clearly. I try to give an explanation, although I don't try to argue or debate the deal. I'm sure that many of the things I say no to will get funded and some of them might become incredibly successful companies. That's ok with me and – even if I say no – I'm still rooting for you. However, if I say no, please don't respond and ask me to refer you to someone. You don't really want me to do this, even if you don't realize it. By referring you to someone else, at some level I am implicitly endorsing you. At the same time, I just told you that I'm not interested in exploring funding your deal. These two constructs are in conflict with each other. The person I refer you to will immediately ask me if I'm interested in funding your deal. I'm now in the weird position of implicitly endorsing you on one side, while rejecting you on the other. While this isn't necessarily comfortable for me, it's useless to you as the likelihood of the person I've just referred you to taking you seriously is very low. In fact, you'd probably have a better shot at it if I wasn't in the mix in the first place! While I'm concerned about my time, it's secondary. I can say "no" a second time (to your request for a referral) very quickly and – if I'm so inclined – I can point you to this blog post. Somewhere in a parallel universe, someone trained a bunch of us (probably Networking 101) to always "ask for something" when you hear a "no" (e.g. keep the conversation going, get a referral, try a different question.) There are cases where this isn't useful – to you. 19/11/2007 为什么VC会说“也许”,如果让他们说行/不行Why VCs Say "Maybe" and How You Can Get Them To Say Yes/Noby Furqan Nazeeri A lot has been written about how venture capitalists are, shall we say, less than direct in terms of communicating a decision to pass on an investment opportunity. If you read the forums on sites like TheFunded, you'll see a lot of hand wringing about how VCs show high interest initially and then go dark (Guy Kawasaki's famous S-H-I-T-S principal from his fabulous book Art of the Start). When I was out raising money, this lack of follow-up drove me crazy. I viewed it as beyond unprofessional and downright inefficient. I remember thinking that the VC is either a wimp and is afraid to tell me no or is on an ego trip and doesn't feel I'm worth his or her time for a simple follow up call. Now, I'm sure there are some VCs out there that do show that level of contempt for entrepreneurs, but I'm sure that's not the reason why most do it. Having sat in on a number of pitches as an "acting venture capitalist" here's the real reason why even a blue-blooded entrepreneur such as myself is sometimes tempted to breach etiquette--the vast majority of entrepreneurs don't take no for an answer. As they shouldn't...what company would succeed if the founder quit every time they heard no? Think about it. If someone (particularly a VC) told you that, "they were concerned the market wasn't big enough" any entrepreneur worth their salt would come back with a detailed presentation on why the market is "conservatively estimated to be $10 billion." So in a round-about way, VCs think they are saving entrepreneurs time by doing this (not to mention saving their own time). So how should VCs and entrepreneurs best deal with this? The most constructive solution from the investor side of things is one I've learned from Steve Murry. I've never seen Steve do the high interest / stall thing, instead he either delivers a clear "no and here's why" that leaves no uncertainty or he delivers a "not now, but here is what could change my mind." And, in fact, I've seen the latter actually turn into an investment a year plus after the first meeting, i.e. the feedback has to be genuine. As for entrepreneurs, the best response is to be direct. I think a totally appropriate response a week or two after a meeting without any feedback is to say that you, "normally associate no follow up with a lack of interest and that while you'd love to work with XYZ you want to be efficient with time so unless you hear otherwise you'll assume there is no interest at this time." If everyone followed these "new rules," the private equity market place would be the better for it. 18/11/2007 如何“管理”你的投资人Tips for "Managing" Your Investors
by T.D. Klein I asked one of the very best operators I know how he managed his relationships with investors so successfully, notwithstanding going through the ups and downs of a startup. This, in its entirety, is his response. It's very insightful and I guarantee if you follow it you are sure to make your investor relations better.
Overall goals
16/11/2007 创业企业融资时的估值by: 桂曙光 很多创业者清楚自己公司每年能有多大收入、多少利润,但真正有几个创业者知道自己公司在资本市场上会值一个什么样的价格呢?应该不太多!在公司运营是,这其实也不是什么大不了的问题,但在公司面对资本市场的时候,这个问题就会困惑企业家了。每个公司都有起自身价值,价值评估(估值,Valuation)是资本市场参与者对一个公司在特定阶段价值的判断。非上市公司,尤其是初创公司的估值是一个独特的、有挑战性的工作,其过程和方法通常是科学性和灵活性相结合。 公司在进行股权融资(Equity Financing)或兼并收购(Merger & Acquisition, M&A)等资本运作时,投资方一方面要对公司业务、规模、发展趋势、财务状况等因素感兴趣,另一方面,也要认可公司对其要出让的股权的估值。这跟我们在市场买东西的道理一样,满意产品质量和功能,还要对价格能接受。 估值方法 公司估值有一些定量的方法,但操作过程中要考虑到一些定性的因素,传统的财务分析只提供估值参考和确定公司估值的可能范围。根据市场及公司情况,被广泛应用的有以下几种估值方法: 1.可比公司法 首先要挑选与非上市公司同行业可比或可参照的上市公司,以同类公司的股价与财务数据为依据,计算出主要财务比率,然后用这些比率作为市场价格乘数来推断目标公司的价值,比如P/E(市盈率,价格/利润)、P/S法(价格/销售额)。 目前在国内的风险投资(VC)市场,P/E法是比较常见的估值方法。通常我们所说的上市公司市盈率有两种: 历史市盈率(Trailing P/E)- 即当前市值/公司上一个财务年度的利润(或前12个月的利润) 预测市盈率(Forward P/E)- 即当前市值/公司当前财务年度的利润(或未来12个月的利润) 投资人是投资一个公司的未来,是对公司未来的经营能力给出目前的价格,所以他们用P/E法估值就是: 公司价值=预测市盈率×公司未来12个月利润。 公司未来12个月的利润可以通过公司的财务预测进行估算,那么估值的最大问题在于如何确定预测市盈率了。一般说来,预测市盈率是历史市盈率的一个折扣,比如说NASDAQ某个行业的平均历史市盈率是40,那预测市盈率大概是30左右,对于同行业、同等规模的非上市公司,参考的预测市盈率需要再打个折扣,15-20左右,对于同行业且规模较小的初创企业,参考的预测市盈率需要在再打个折扣,就成了7-10了。这也就目前国内主流的外资VC投资是对企业估值的大致P/E倍数。比如,如果某公司预测融资后下一年度的利润是100万美元,公司的估值大致就是700-1000万美元,如果投资人投资200万美元,公司出让的股份大约是20%-35%。 对于有收入但是没有利润的公司,P/E就没有意义,比如很多初创公司很多年也不能实现正的预测利润,那么可以用P/S法来进行估值,大致方法跟P/E法一样。 2.可比交易法 挑选与初创公司同行业、在估值前一段合适时期被投资、并购的公司,基于融资或并购交易的定价依据作为参考,从中获取有用的财务或非财务数据,求出一些相应的融资价格乘数,据此评估目标公司。 比如A公司刚刚获得融资,B公司在业务领域跟A公司相同,经营规模上(比如收入)比A公司大一倍,那么投资人对B公司的估值应该是A公司估值的一倍左右。在比如分众传媒在分别并购框架传媒和聚众传媒的时候,一方面以分众的市场参数作为依据,另一方面,框架的估值也可作为聚众估值的依据。 可比交易法不对市场价值进行分析,而只是统计同类公司融资并购价格的平均溢价水平,再用这个溢价水平计算出目标公司的价值。 3.现金流折现 这是一种较为成熟的估值方法,通过预测公司未来自由现金流、资本成本,对公司未来自由现金流进行贴现,公司价值即为未来现金流的现值。计算公式如下:
(其中,CFn: 每年的预测自由现金流; r: 贴现率或资本成本) 贴现率是处理预测风险的最有效的方法,因为初创公司的预测现金流有很大的不确定性,其贴现率比成熟公司的贴现率要高得多。寻求种子资金的初创公司的资本成本也许在50%-100%之间,早期的创业公司的资本成本为40%-60%,晚期的创业公司的资本成本为30%-50%。对比起来,更加成熟的经营记录的公司,资本成本为10%-25%之间。 这种方法比较适用于较为成熟、偏后期的私有公司或上市公司,比如凯雷收购徐工集团就是采用这种估值方法。 4.资产法 资产法是假设一个谨慎的投资者不会支付超过与目标公司同样效用的资产的收购成本。比如中海油竞购尤尼科,根据其石油储量对公司进行估值。 这个方法给出了最现实的数据,通常是以公司发展所支出的资金为基础。其不足之处在于假定价值等同于使用的资金,投资者没有考虑与公司运营相关的所有无形价值。另外,资产法没有考虑到未来预测经济收益的价值。所以,资产法对公司估值,结果是最低的。 回报要求 在风险投资领域,好像他们对公司估值是非常深奥和神秘,但有些讽刺性的是,他们的估值方法有时非常简单。 风险投资估值运用投资回报倍数,早期投资项目VC回报要求是10倍,扩张期/后期投资的回报要求是3-5倍。为什么是10倍,看起来有点暴利?标准的风险投资组合如下(10个投资项目):
尽管VC希望所有投资的公司都能成为下一个微软、下一个google,但现实就是这么残酷。VC要求在成功的公司身上赚到10倍来弥补其他失败投资。投资回报与投资阶段相关。投资早期公司的VC通常会追求10倍以上的回报,而投资中后期公司的VC通常会追求3-5倍的回报。 假设VC在投资一个早期公司4年后,公司以1亿美元上市或被并购,并且期间没有后续融资。运用10倍回报原则,VC对公司的投资后估值(post-money valuation)就是1000万美元。如果公司当前的融资额是200万美元并预留100万美元的期权,VC对公司的投资前估值(pre-money valuation)就是700万美元。 VC对初创公司估值的经验范围大约是100万美元–2000万美元,通常的范围是300万美元–1000万美元。通常初创公司第一轮融资金额是50万美元–1000万美元。 公司最终的估值由投资人能够获得的预期回报倍数、以及投资人之间的竞争情况决定。比如一个目标公司被很多投资人追捧,有些投资人可能会愿意降低自己的投资回报率期望,以一个高一点的价格拿下这个投资机会。 期权设置 投资人给被投资公司一个投资前估值,那么通常他要求获得股份就是: 投资人股份=投资额/投资后估值 比如投资后估值500万美元,投资人投100万美元,投资人的股份就是20%,公司投资前的估值理论上应该是400万美元。 但通常投资人要求公司拿出10%左右的股份作为期权,相应的价值是50万美元左右,那么投资前的实际估值变成了350万美元了: 350万实际估值 + $50万期权 +100万现金投资 = 500万投资后估值 相应地,企业家的剩余股份只有70%(=80%-10%)了。 把期权放在投资前估值中,投资人可以获得三个方面的好处: 首先,期权仅仅稀释原始股东。如果期权池是在投资后估值中,将会等比例稀释普通股和优先股股东。 比如10%的期权在投资后估值中提供,那么投资人的股份变成18%,企业家的股份变成72%: 20%(或80%)×(1-10%)= 18%(72%) 可见,投资人在这里占了企业家2%的便宜。 其次,期权池占投资前估值的份额比想象要大。看起来比实际小,是因为它把投资后估值的比例,应用到投资前估值。在上例中,期权是投资后估值的10%,但是占投资前估值的25%: 50万期权/400万投资前估值 = 12.5% 第三,如果你在下一轮融资之前出售公司,所有没有发行的和没有授予的期权将会被取消。这种反向稀释让所有股东等比例受益,尽管是原始股东在一开始买的单。比如有5%的期权没有授予,这些期权将按股份比例分配给股东,所以投资人应该可以拿到1%,原始股东拿到4%。公司的股权结构变成: 100% = 原始股东84%、投资人21%、团队5%。 换句话说,企业家的部分投资前价值进入了投资人的口袋。 风险投资行业都是要求期权在投资前出,所以企业家唯一能做的是尽量根据公司未来人才引进和激励规划,确定一个小一些的期权池。 对赌条款 很多时候投资人给公司估值用P/E倍数的方法,目前在国内的首轮融资中,投资后估值大致8-10倍左右,这个倍数对不同行业的公司和不同发展阶段的公司不太一样。 投资后估值 (P) = P/E倍数×下一年度预测利润 (E) 如果采用10倍P/E,预测利润100万美元,投资后估值就是1000万美元。如果投资200万,投资人股份就是20%。 如果投资人跟企业家能够在P/E倍数上达成一致,估值的最大的谈判点就在于利润预测了。如果投资人的判断和企业家对财务预测有较大差距(当然是投资人认为企业家做不到预测利润了),可能在投资协议里就会出现对赌条款(Ratchet Terms),对公司估值进行调整,按照实际做到的利润对公司价值和股份比例进行重新计算: 投资后估值 (P) = P/E倍数×下一年度实际利润 (E) 如果实际利润只有50万美元,投资后估值就只有500万美元,相应的,投资人应该分配的股份应该40%,企业家需要拿出20%的股份出来补偿投资人。 200万/500万=40% 当然,这种对赌情况是比较彻底的,有些投资人也会相对“友善”一些,给一个保底的公司估值。比如上面例子,假如投资人要求按照公式调整估值,但是承诺估值不低于800万,那么如果公司的实际利润只有50万美元,公司的估值不是500万美元,而是800万美元,投资人应该获得的股份就是25%: 200万/800万=25% 对赌协议除了可以用预测利润作为对赌条件外,也可以用其他条件,比如收入、用户数、资源量等等。 总结及结论 公司估值是投资人和企业家协商的结果,仁者见仁,智者见智,没有一个什么公允值;公司的估值受到众多因素的影响,特别是对于初创公司,所以估值也要考虑投资人的增值服务能力和投资协议中的其他非价格条款;最重要的一点是,时间和市场不等人,不要因为双方估值分歧而错过投资和被投资机会。
15/11/2007 尽职调查与反向尽职调查Due Diligence & Reverse Due Diligence By Furqan Nazeeri
You just signed a term sheet for your first round of venture capital. Congratulations! Now what?
While every fund has their own process and each deal works a bit differently, what you can expect between signing a term sheet and closing the round (to which I refer in aggregate as "diligence") basically falls into four buckets:
1. Confirmatory due diligence. What this means is the investor is switching gears from "why should I do this deal?" mode to "why shouldn't I do this deal?" mode. There is a pretty standard set of items the investor will request. Click here for the generic diligence request list that Softbank uses. Depending upon the stage of the company, there are usually a 100+ documents that need to be collected and delivered. I'm a big fan of using Microsoft Sharepoint to manage document delivery. In fact, I recommend using it to deliver documents from the beginning of the fund raising process. For example, when a VC asks for your "financial model" you should point them to Sharepoint instead of emailing the file. One benefit is you can check who's accessed the file and you can turn off access if they pass. For $40 per month you can buy a hosted version of Sharepoint. I've used this company before with good results.
2. Syndication. For many deals, particularly the first institutional round, the full amount of the raise won't be spoken for. For example, if the raise is $8MM, the lead investor might be committed to $4-5MM. Syndication is the process of finding one or more additional investors to complete the round. If you had the good fortune of receiving multiple term sheets to begin with (and assuming you like one of the others) the easiest way to complete the syndicate is to invite those folks to participate on your newly signed term sheet. Failing that, you should reach out to the firms with whom you got close, but not all the way. The expectation is that the entrepreneur leads and directs the syndication process. The good news is that having a signed term sheet (hopefully from a reputable firm) makes it a lot easier than getting the term sheet to begin with.
3. Documentation. Generating about 2-inches of legal agreements codifying the investment. Usually company counsel will take the lead on drafting documents; although it's not unheard of for the lead investor to do the first draft. You should ask that the syndicate use one law firm, but if they insist on each using there own, plan on the process taking a week or two longer than it would otherwise.
4. Closing. Signing the paperwork and wiring the money. Yeah! It used to be that closings were held in person at some attorney's office (at least that was my experience early in my career) but today that almost never happens. The closing is usually held over a couple of days after everything has been agreed and then they sign and fax their signature pages to company counsel. Depending upon how many signatures, it can take a few days to complete.
It is rare (although not unheard of) for a deal to fall apart after signing of a term sheet. I did an informal poll of some VCs and found that less than 10% of early stage VC deals fall apart and fail to close. The best thing you can do as an entrepreneur to avoid this is to ask the VC (ideally right before signing the term sheet) what remaining concerns they have and what diligence they expect to perform. The more explicit you are in asking these questions, the more likely you are to avoid surprises on either side of the table.
Diligence typically takes anywhere from 30 to 60 days, although it's not unheard of to go longer, particularly if the company and lead investor still need to finalize the syndication of the round.
Many first time CEOs mistakenly think that due diligence (in conjunction with closing a round of venture capital) is a one-way street. It is definitely not. And if you, as CEO, are in the enviable position of having multiple term sheets, then doing some diligence can be the swing factor in deciding which investor(s) to invite into your board room. With that in mind, here are a few tips on how to conduct what I call reverse due diligence:
Also, if the references are local, you should invite them out for coffee or a drink as you're more likely to get candid feedback.
Most likely you will find that one of your potential investors will distinguish themselves during this diligence process. Worst case, if everyone comes through with equally positive references, you will have some good information on how to work with your new board member. 14/11/2007 创业者向VC推销企业的10条要点Top 10 Tips For Entrepreneurs Pitching VCsAfter sitting through 20+ pitches as a "VC" and having given 10 times that from the "sell-side" of the table, I figure it's time to throw my hat in the ring along with all those offering advice to entrepreneurs pitching VCs. In B-school, we had a thing for "top 10" lists, so please forgive the following format: 10. Get someone you know to introduce you. Everyone knows this, but it's worth repeating. I've seen a lot of CEOs/CFOs with lists of VC funds they are pitching and the status of each (a sort of "fundraising pipeline"). But I've yet to see one of these spreadsheets with the most important two columns: (a) who's going to introduce us to this fund and (b) what's their relationship to the fund, i.e. how does the fund view them. Ideally the person making the intro is someone who's made money for the fund in one capacity or another. Do yourself a favor and add these columns to your spreadsheet. 9. Don't bring the whole company. Who and how many folks to bring obviously depends upon circumstances, but ideally it's the CEO and one other key executive (e.g. founder, VP Sales, CTO, etc.). Any more than that you're fighting for air time or looking like moss on a rock, neither of which help the cause. The best pitch I've seen so far was given by the CEO alone (to a group of more than a dozen). 8. Arrive early and set up your stuff. Every shop has a different A/V setup. Great entrepreneurs come prepared…wireless modem, memory stick, Ethernet cable, hard copy screen shots… Woe to the entrepreneur who starts off the meeting with a bunch of VCs sitting around and yelling "press function-F7!" 7. Introduce yourself by describing how you've made money for shareholders. Less than 5% of the management teams I've seen have figured this one out. The best intros are ones where multiple people on the management team can say, "I was CXO of Lightning-in-a-Bottle, Inc. for 3 years and we raised umpteen million returning numberteen-X to investors." That's what VCs call an "A-team." Every exec worth their salt should be able to come up with some version of this such as, "I was VP whatever at Blue Chip, Inc. and generated a 5X return on capital with my insert project name" although too many of the later on the team will get a "B" label from savvy investors. At all costs, entrepreneurs should avoid what 95% of us do and launch into an intro with, "I worked at…" and then proceed to name drop 5 companies that are successful but which everyone knows probably had little to do with said executive. 6. Tailor the pitch to the audience. When the VCs are introducing themselves, great entrepreneurs are doing more than just listening; they are qualifying the prospect. Entrepreneurs should take the VC intro part of the meeting to ask a few questions with the goal of understanding the VC's perspective…how much do they know about my market, my company, competitors, etc.? Armed with this, the team can tailor the presentation to the audience. 5. The slide presentation should be at maximum 10 slides. Do the math: 10 4. When a potential investor asks a question, answer it. It's rare that the response, "Good question! If you could just hold that thought until slide 36, I'll address that point." The trick to understanding why is to realize that, when asking questions, smart investors are really trying to get a feel for what the CEO is like, how they think on their feet, perform under pressure, listen, relate to investors and what it would be like to work with the entrepreneur in question. So every time a VC asks a question, the entrepreneur should think to themselves, "oh, she just asked me what it's like to work with me" and then respond. 3. Don't hide bad news. Entrepreneurs are by definition optimists, but there is a well known fine line between genius and insanity. I've seen a lot of entrepreneurs, including myself, paint themselves into a corner instead of proactively defining holes or unknowns in their business plan as manageable risks. Savvy investors bucket these folks as "first-timers" or "green." 2. Be concise. 1. Practice, practice, practice! I've heard many CEOs say, "gee, that's the first time I've seen that slide...John (VP of whatever) do you want to walk us through this one?" It sounds silly, but for those of us not gifted with Bill Clinton-like stage presence, we should practice the full pitch at least 50 times, ideally in front of a video camera and a live crowd. A lot of entrepreneurs "practice" with their first 10, 20 or more VC pitches, but that is really a disservice to all involved. If a CEO can develop a total comfort with the presentation (slides and delivery) then that comfort level shows through and they have a chance of really connecting with their potential partner/investor. 13/11/2007 投资协议条款清单:红利VC Term Sheets: Dividendby Dick Costolo When entrepreneurs are raising Venture Capital, it seems like attention and focus are weighted 80% to pre-money valuation and a couple percent each to all the other terms, and I think this is a mistake. I've talked previously about obsessing over pre-money valuation in an early round (seed, A, B) at the expense of other terms, and I'll start talking about some of these other terms now in a series of posts. I'll try to interlace these posts with operations and company structure posts to keep things interesting for everybody. Today's VC term sheet topic is Dividends. FeedBurner investor Brad Feld wrote about this topic extensively in one of a series of posts about Term Sheets from the VC perspective. I'm going to copy Brad's typical Dividend section language here and discuss it briefly from the entrepreneur perspective. "Dividends: The holders of the Series A Preferred shall be entitled to receive [non-]cumulative dividends in preference to any dividend on the Common Stock at the rate of [8%] of the Original Purchase Price per annum[, when and as declared by the Board of Directors]. The holders of Series A Preferred also shall be entitled to participate pro rata in any dividends paid on the Common Stock on an as-if-converted basis." The first thing to point out is that you should pay careful attention to the areas in here that will vary from deal to deal. Brad has done a good job of highlighting these. There are three of them and I'll talk briefly about each. Before I do that, let's briefly consider the "founding fathers' intent" behind the dividend section. The explanation you will sometimes get from Venture Capital investors is that the dividend is just there in case the deal goes sideways (not a home run, not a complete bust), and it therefore provides for some return on investment at some point that juices the investment and drives some value back to the investors. As Brad note in his post, "...[they] don't provide venture returns, they're simply modest juice in a deal." So, as an entrepreneur, you would like to minimize the impact of any dividends you have to pay out. To simplify it in the extreme: Automatic cumulative dividends bad, non-cumulative non-automatic dividends good. If you're accruing an automatic cumulative 8% dividend on the investment dollars, you won't like what those kinds of numbers start to look like in year 5 and year 6. More importantly, cumulative dividends are an accounting nightmare and you will spend more time than you care to even know working with your finance team and auditors on how you should account for cumulative dividends and their effects. Fortunately, Brad's typical language above makes our job easy, and we can quickly highlight what you want to negotiate in your term sheet. You want three things: a) you want non-cumulative, not cumulative, Dividends; b) you want the lowest possible dividend percent, let's say 6%; c) you really want "when and as declared by the Board" in this section because the board will include operating executives of the company, perhaps a founder, and different investors, and these will rarely, if ever, be declared. Having said all this, an obvious question that arises is "if non-cumulative when declared" is so benign, why not negotiate the section out altogether? Obviously you can try to do whatever you want, but one thing any private equity investors are going to look to do in any deal is look for some opportunities to manage the downside risk. This is one of those sections, and just get this sucker to the point at which it causes you no pain. Non-cumulative when and as declared by the board is reasonable and causes you no pain. I would suggest you read all of Brad's Term Sheet posts if you're out raising money. Brad writes in a very common sense way that generally reflects both sides of the discussion about Term Sheets. 12/11/2007 给投资人看什么?商业计划,保密协议,投资吸引力What should I send investors? Part 3: Business Plans, NDAs, and Traction.by Venture Hacks Summary: Don't send long business plans to investors. Don't ask for NDAs. Don't share information that must remain confidential. Understand that investors care about traction over everything else. Don't send a business plan.
— David Cowan, Bessemer Venture Partners Don't send a 50-page business plan to investors. Nobody reads them and nobody executes them. Investors who want a long plan look bad—so do companies that generate them. The milestones slide of your deck summarizes the company's plan for the next 1-3 quarters. Document your detailed plans on a napkin, wiki, spreadsheet, deck, to-do list, or whatever. Share it with investors sometime around your second meeting and make sure they generally agree with your plan. But don't send investors a 50-page sales pitch that you call a business plan—an elevator pitch and deck are sufficient. You don't need an executive summary either—an elevator pitch and deck are sufficient. Don't ask for an NDA.
Getting an NDA from professional investors is almost impossible. It can happen (like a rainbow!), but you shouldn't bother. Investors don't sign NDAs because they don't want to get sued over them. Competing companies tend to get started at the same time because the market timing is right. Investors don't want you to sue them if they fund your competitor—so they don't sign NDAs. Read Why Most VC's Don't Sign NDAs by Brad Feld to learn more. Asking for an NDA creates a barrier to getting funded—aren't there enough barriers already? And this barrier is insurmountable: your request will be declined or, worse, ignored because you haven’t done your homework. Accept the fact that your elevator pitch and deck will contain information that you don't want printed on the front page of the Wall Street Journal. Fortunately, they won't get that far. And if you must keep something confidential, don't email it to investors and don't mention it in person. Investors often look at several similar companies at once. Your plans probably won't get to your competitors, but you should assume they will. Traction rules.
Whether they're reading an elevator pitch or listening to a presentation, investors care most about actual traction in a seemingly large market. If you have incredible traction in what seems to be a large market, you can raise money no matter what the product and team look like—although a good product and team will improve your terms. If you don’t have incredible traction but the market seems large, your product and team are both critical to raising money. If the market doesn't seem large to them, investors won't care about your product or your team. Traction is demonstrated profit, revenue, customers, pilot customers, or users (in order of importance), and their rates of change, and the rates of change of the rates of change, and the rates of change of… Read The only thing that matters by Marc Andreessen to learn more. 11/11/2007 VC如何确定股权比例How VC's Determine % Ownership Thresholdsby Matt McCall Most VC's will generally say they target 20-30% ownership in a company to "make it worth their time". This means that if they invest $3m early on, they expect the post-money to be around $10-15m and if, in later rounds, they are investing $10m, they expect to have a $30-$50m post-$. Often, however, VC's will use the "percentage" threshold as a means by which to increase money into a round or to get the valuation down. I have seen a given VC say they need 25% ownership for deal (to get valuation down) and do a more competitively sought deal at 15% two weeks later. In the end, two things drive all of this. First, there are legitimate minimum investment amounts a firm needs to have per deal. A $500 million fund will never get its capital deployed by doing $2m and $3m deals. They need to put $7-10m to play early and $20m+ over the life of the investment. Second, the valuation (and hence % ownership) will be driven by attractiveness and competitiveness of the deal. In the end, it is really about valuation (assuming their investment appetite remains in a set range). 10/11/2007 对创业企业重要的事情The only thing that mattersby Marc Andreessen
This post is all about the only thing that matters for a new startup. But first, some theory: If you look at a broad cross-section of startups -- say, 30 or 40 or more; enough to screen out the pure flukes and look for patterns -- two obvious facts will jump out at you. First obvious fact: there is an incredibly wide divergence of success -- some of those startups are insanely successful, some highly successful, many somewhat successful, and quite a few of course outright fail. Second obvious fact: there is an incredibly wide divergence of caliber and quality for the three core elements of each startup -- team, product, and market. At any given startup, the team will range from outstanding to remarkably flawed; the product will range from a masterpiece of engineering to barely functional; and the market will range from booming to comatose. And so you start to wonder -- what correlates the most to success -- team, product, or market? Or, more bluntly, what causes success? And, for those of us who are students of startup failure -- what's most dangerous: a bad team, a weak product, or a poor market? Let's start by defining terms. The caliber of a startup team can be defined as the suitability of the CEO, senior staff, engineers, and other key staff relative to the opportunity in front of them. You look at a startup and ask, will this team be able to optimally execute against their opportunity? I focus on effectiveness as opposed to experience, since the history of the tech industry is full of highly successful startups that were staffed primarily by people who had never "done it before". The quality of a startup's product can be defined as how impressive the product is to one customer or user who actually uses it: How easy is the product to use? How feature rich is it? How fast is it? How extensible is it? How polished is it? How many (or rather, how few) bugs does it have? The size of a startup's market is the the number, and growth rate, of those customers or users for that product. (Let's assume for this discussion that you can make money at scale -- that the cost of acquiring a customer isn't higher than the revenue that customer will generate.) Some people have been objecting to my classification as follows: "How great can a product be if nobody wants it?" In other words, isn't the quality of a product defined by how appealing it is to lots of customers?
So: If you ask entrepreneurs or VCs which of team, product, or market is most important, many will say team. This is the obvious answer, in part because in the beginning of a startup, you know a lot more about the team than you do the product, which hasn't been built yet, or the market, which hasn't been explored yet. Plus, we've all been raised on slogans like "people are our most important asset" -- at least in the US, pro-people sentiments permeate our culture, ranging from high school self-esteem programs to the Declaration of Independence's inalienable rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness -- so the answer that team is the most important feels right. And who wants to take the position that people don't matter? On the other hand, if you ask engineers, many will say product. This is a product business, startups invent products, customers buy and use the products. Apple and Google are the best companies in the industry today because they build the best products. Without the product there is no company. Just try having a great team and no product, or a great market and no product. What's wrong with you? Now let me get back to work on the product. Personally, I'll take the third position -- I'll assert that market is the most important factor in a startup's success or failure. Why? In a great market -- a market with lots of real potential customers -- the market pulls product out of the startup. The market needs to be fulfilled and the market will be fulfilled, by the first viable product that comes along. The product doesn't need to be great; it just has to basically work. And, the market doesn't care how good the team is, as long as the team can produce that viable product. In short, customers are knocking down your door to get the product; the main goal is to actually answer the phone and respond to all the emails from people who want to buy. And when you have a great market, the team is remarkably easy to upgrade on the fly. This is the story of search keyword advertising, and Internet auctions, and TCP/IP routers. Conversely, in a terrible market, you can have the best product in the world and an absolutely killer team, and it doesn't matter -- you're going to fail. You'll break your pick for years trying to find customers who don't exist for your marvelous product, and your wonderful team will eventually get demoralized and quit, and your startup will die. This is the story of videoconferencing, and workflow software, and micropayments. In honor of Andy Rachleff, formerly of Benchmark Capital, who crystallized this formulation for me, let me present Rachleff's Law of Startup Success: The #1 company-killer is lack of market. Andy puts it this way:
You can obviously screw up a great market -- and that has been done, and not infrequently -- but assuming the team is baseline competent and the product is fundamentally acceptable, a great market will tend to equal success and a poor market will tend to equal failure. Market matters most. And neither a stellar team nor a fantastic product will redeem a bad market. OK, so what? Well, first question: Since team is the thing you have the most control over at the start, and everyone wants to have a great team, what does a great team actually get you? Hopefully a great team gets you at least an OK product, and ideally a great product. However, I can name you a bunch of examples of great teams that totally screwed up their products. Great products are really, really hard to build. Hopefully a great team also gets you a great market -- but I can also name you lots of examples of great teams that executed brilliantly against terrible markets and failed. Markets that don't exist don't care how smart you are. In my experience, the most frequent case of great team paired with bad product and/or terrible market is the second- or third-time entrepreneur whose first company was a huge success. People get cocky, and slip up. There is one high-profile, highly successful software entrepreneur right now who is burning through something like $80 million in venture funding in his latest startup and has practically nothing to show for it except for some great press clippings and a couple of beta customers -- because there is virtually no market for what he is building. Conversely, I can name you any number of weak teams whose startups were highly successful due to explosively large markets for what they were doing. Finally, to quote Tim Shephard: "A great team is a team that will always beat a mediocre team, given the same market and product." Second question: Can't great products sometimes create huge new markets? Absolutely. This is a best case scenario, though. VMWare is the most recent company to have done it -- VMWare's product was so profoundly transformative out of the gate that it catalyzed a whole new movement toward operating system virtualization, which turns out to be a monster market. And of course, in this scenario, it also doesn't really matter how good your team is, as long as the team is good enough to develop the product to the baseline level of quality the market requires and get it fundamentally to market. Understand I'm not saying that you should shoot low in terms of quality of team, or that VMWare's team was not incredibly strong -- it was, and is. I'm saying, bring a product as transformative as VMWare's to market and you're going to succeed, full stop. Short of that, I wouldn't count on your product creating a new market from scratch. Third question: as a startup founder, what should I do about all this? Let's introduce Rachleff's Corollary of Startup Success: The only thing that matters is getting to product/market fit. Product/market fit means being in a good market with a product that can satisfy that market. You can always feel when product/market fit isn't happening. The customers aren't quite getting value out of the product, word of mouth isn't spreading, usage isn't growing that fast, press reviews are kind of "blah", the sales cycle takes too long, and lots of deals never close. And you can always feel product/market fit when it's happening. The customers are buying the product just as fast as you can make it -- or usage is growing just as fast as you can add more servers. Money from customers is piling up in your company checking account. You're hiring sales and customer support staff as fast as you can. Reporters are calling because they've heard about your hot new thing and they want to talk to you about it. You start getting entrepreneur of the year awards from Harvard Business School. Investment bankers are staking out your house. You could eat free for a year at Buck's. Lots of startups fail before product/market fit ever happens. My contention, in fact, is that they fail because they never get to product/market fit. Carried a step further, I believe that the life of any startup can be divided into two parts: before product/market fit (call this "BPMF") and after product/market fit ("APMF"). When you are BPMF, focus obsessively on getting to product/market fit. Do whatever is required to get to product/market fit. Including changing out people, rewriting your product, moving into a different market, telling customers no when you don't want to, telling customers yes when you don't want to, raising that fourth round of highly dilutive venture capital -- whatever is required. When you get right down to it, you can ignore almost everything else. I'm not suggesting that you do ignore everything else -- just that judging from what I've seen in successful startups, you can. Whenever you see a successful startup, you see one that has reached product/market fit -- and usually along the way screwed up all kinds of other things, from channel model to pipeline development strategy to marketing plan to press relations to compensation policies to the CEO sleeping with the venture capitalist. And the startup is still successful. Conversely, you see a surprising number of really well-run startups that have all aspects of operations completely buttoned down, HR policies in place, great sales model, thoroughly thought-through marketing plan, great interview processes, outstanding catered food, 30" monitors for all the programmers, top tier VCs on the board -- heading straight off a cliff due to not ever finding product/market fit. Ironically, once a startup is successful, and you ask the founders what made it successful, they will usually cite all kinds of things that had nothing to do with it. People are terrible at understanding causation. But in almost every case, the cause was actually product/market fit. Because, really, what else could it possibly be? 09/11/2007 如果风险投资死了,结果怎样?If Venture Capital is Dead, What's Next?by Suzanne Dingwall Williams Sometime soon, pundits are going to officially declare that venture capital in Canada is dead. We've given it a good 15 years, they'll say, but venture capital is not a sustainable business here. They will point to the increasing number of defunct funds that no longer invest, keeping the doors open only to manage existing investments while the management fees last. Other VCs have either re-positioned themselves as asset managers or are in talks with their investors about returning to their origins as hedge funds. The pundits will note the recent halting of efforts to raise new funds by prominent VCs. The root cause of this, they'll say, is the almost complete withdrawal of support by the pension funds and institutions that invest in venture capital funds. These backers have either: (a) gotten out of venture capital altogether, or (b) instead decided to invest their money in government initiatives, such as the new $90 million + seed fund that the Government of Ontario announced before the recent election. All of these factors, the pundits will say, have led to a permanent sectoral decline. Venture capital in Canada is no longer an industry, but a financial product offered by only a handful of players. When someone finally says this, I'll agree. But I'll also say that, as someone who advises entrepreneurs, I don't particularly care. All this tells me is that companies will now use different financial tools to feed growth, using business plans that are not shoehorned into the somewhat artificial venture capital model for growth - i.e., in and out in 3-7 years. Here are the things to watch as we enter a new era of company creation: 1. The increase in advisors: there are many former VCs who are looking to stay in the game by providing advice and some modest seed capital out of their own pockets. They reckon that they can earn money in deal origination fees until they establish themselves and are able to raise a modest fund, much as Jeff Clavier has done. However, there are already many advisors who've been working in this space. Excess supply is always good news for the consumer - you, the entrepreneur. Tread carefully, though. 2. Increased government funding for seed investments and commercialization: the Ontario government has thrown almost unlimited amounts of money at a variety of initiatives to create public-sponsored infrastructure for startups. Which keeps the government agenda focused for the forseeable future on building an "innovation economy". Watch for additional funding options, managed by a new set of players. The federal government also is actively investing through EDC and Sustainable Technology Development Canada, among others. Can't attract money there? Consider moving part of your operations to Saskatchewan or New Brunswick. 3. New financial tools: there are a number of financial tools and structures that could attract a new kind of investor to early stage ventures. Look for a rise in the number of investments made through limited partnership structures and (for companies with some cash flow) capital pool companies. If venture capital funds are no longer part of your financing strategy, you are free to explore any model that meets the legitiamte needs of your backers. 4.Company creation through consolidation: Smart VCs will (and already are) looking for up-and-comers to bootstrap onto existing portfolio investments. There will be a near-term rise in the number of early acquisitions in some niches. 5. A return to seed investing by VCs:Venture Capital may no longer be an industry, but it's not extinct, either. There will still be funds, likely falling into two categories: (a) those who invest internationally, but retain local offices, and (b)those invest locally in emerging industries where Canada still could emerge as a world leader (clean tech, biotech and drug discovery/diagnostics). Ironically, local VCs ackowledge that they will have to play a greater role at seed stage or risk getting shut out by US VCs in later stage rounds, as was the case with iUpload. 6. Bootstrapping is the new black.Modifying business plans so that you grow only as funds allow is a return to basics, I know. But it works - ask RIM. There's also a number of creative models and ways to bootstrap, which we're seeing great examples here at our firm daily. 08/11/2007 出售创业企业:谁主导过程Selling the Startup:Who Runs the Process?
by Suzanne Dingwall Williams
In a startup, selling the business tends to be an opportunistic thing, rather than part of a planned corporate strategy. Which means that, the question of who should manage the process of selling the business, is often not addressed until a serious expression of interest has been received from a potential acquiror. What next? In a public company, the path is set: designate a special committee of the board, composed almost exclusively of independent directors, and hire an advisor to shepherd the process and ultimately render an opinion as to the fairness of the transaction. In an emerging company, the course is less clear. For one thing, "independent" directors often are not truly independent; many are past investees of VCs brought on because of their industry/channel/technical expertise. They often lack the acquisition experience that would make this an effective delegation of the process. By default, then, CEOs are often tempted to allow their VCs to spearhead the effort while they focus on operations. After all, they reason, a director owes a general duty to act in the best interests of all shareholders. Right? Not necessarily. Before we go further, my usual disclaimer: as a general rule, I love VCs. Put a little ketchup on them, and they taste just like chicken. But they don’t necessarily have the skills to act as your quasi-investment banker. This is particularly true outside of Silicon Valley, where most funds have a limited track record of successful exits. Negotiating a financing or a term sheet with a portfolio company is NOT the same thing as negotiating a sale with a large acquiror. For one thing, the leverage is reversed for what VC used to, and some VCs find it hard to be the supplicant. In addition, many VCs are not hard-wired to negotiate aggressive terms outside of the investing context. VCs are in the business of cultivating deal flow. Deal flow comes from relationships. This does not make them predisposed to be aggressive when you are in discussions with, say, a Cisco or an IBM. More importantly, your VCs may not owe you any obligation to consider your best interests in shaping an acquisition. Consider your company’s structure; in most VC-backed companies, it is VCs who control the board and the corporation, thanks to a combination of protective provisions and preferred stock rights. As a recent article by two Berkeley law professors points out, this level of control may entitle VCs to do as they please when selling the business, without regard for the common shareholders. The authors point to the Delaware court ruling in Orban V. Field that "when the preferred control the board, directors do not owe a fiduciary duty specifically to the common shareholders and have wide discretion to benefit the preferred shareholders instead." Don't overlook another tactical issue: time with the acquirer allows management to size up the opportunities available for you post transition, and even shape compensation in a way that allows you to recoup some of the sale proceeds that might otherwise be lost. Don't give that tactical advantage away too quickly. The solution? For many, the board as a group might oversee the sale, without a special committee. An outside advisor can also be effective, if cash permits (and yes, I know some of you have very jaded views on this). But whatever else, management should not disengage from the frontlines. Time to suit up. 07/11/2007 给投资人看什么?--演示PPTWhat should I send investors? Part 2: Deck.by Venture Hack
"PowerPoint plans greatly increase your chance of getting a term sheet, or at least the dignity of a quick no." — David Cowan, Bessemer Venture Partners Summary: An introduction and elevator pitch are critical to getting a meeting. You should also provide a “ten-slide” deck that tells a compelling story about your team, product, traction, and plans. A PowerPoint plan ("deck") is less important than an elevator pitch, and an elevator pitch is less important than an introduction. Read What should I send investors? Part 1: Elevator Pitch for tips on crafting an elevator pitch. Many investors will just skim a deck and take a meeting if the introduction and elevator pitch are good. But you still a need a deck. A deck lets investors learn more about your company. It demonstrates that you've thought about the company in detail. It's an industry norm. And you need one for presentations anyway.
Include a "ten-slide" deck with your elevator pitch.The best deck template in the universe is David Cowan's How To Not Write A Business Plan—use it. There are other templates from excellent sources on the Web, but this is the best. Apply these headings and minor changes to David Cowan's slides:
These slides tell a story.This sequence of slides tells a story:
The product isn't revealed until the fifth slide of this methodical sequence—that's annoying. Fortunately, the elevator pitch and Summary slide kill the suspense by summarizing your company and product before an investor jumps into the deck. Put pictures in the slides and text in the notes.Keep the slides simple, visual, and minimal, with 30 point or larger font. The slides will look great when you present; see Gates, Jobs, & the Zen aesthetic. (We'll cover presentations in a future article, this article is about the deck you send investors.) Put talking points, reasoning, and prose in the notes that accompany each slide. Don't try to cram cogent arguments into bullet points on the slides; see The Cognitive Style of PowerPoint. Email a PDF that combines each slide and its notes on a single page; slide on top, notes on bottom. Please don't email a PowerPoint file unless your deck contains critical animations or movies. You now have a single file for emails and live presentations. An investor can read the slides and notes together and imagine a presentation. And you can present the slides while you refer to the notes. Finally, try Keynote if you're on a Mac. It makes beautiful decks and it’s fun to use. 私募融资步骤Inside the processby Rick Segal Starting the day at 4a on a Sunday, having to roll out of a toasty warm bed into the Canadian winter, is not something I’m all that excited about. Unfortunately, duty calls with this, the beginning of a busy week of meetings, travel, and checking out some new companies. Over the past several weeks, I’ve been packing in the meetings with new companies. I’ve been impressed with the quality of the management and the opportunities being created. It’s also nice to see folks doing some homework on our firm. Many entrepreneurs read this blog, check out our web site and, in general, are doing a good job knowing a bit more about our firm. Well done. And Albert’s been back all focused and ready to ship stuff, go get em Albert. One question that comes up is about the VC process and what to expect, timing, process, etc. I’ve put together this long entry in an attempt to give you our process in the hopes it can help with your expectations. Keep in mind every firm is different and we all have our particular quirks, so your mileage may vary. WARNING: This post is very very long Probably way more information then you’d ever need but I did it this way to try and give you as much behind the scenes, so to speak, because there isn’t really much detail to all the checklist and ‘tip’ stuff we VC types like to throw around. So, in advance, I apologize to those of you who fall asleep, don’t hit your head on the desk. Step One: No Harm No Foul The first step I recommend, if you’ve never done the VC bit before, is to come by for a 30 minute no harm, no foul meeting. You can tell me the general story, give me an idea of what you, your idea, your company, etc, is all about, while getting feedback, suggestions, and a free drink. This meeting typically doesn’t count against you so if the demo blows up, you forget stuff, mess up the names of whatever, etc. The idea is to lower the stress levels so we can have a great conversation that is valuable to both of us. We can also establish, right up front, if we’d be a target financial solution for you. Step Two: The pre-meeting activities Send me electronic materials to read. This is probably where lots of other VCs will give you different opinions. I like data from a market perspective. I want to understand the problem set, the people who will pay, etc. This can take many forms besides the standard Gartner or whomever stuff. I met a women last week who hit upon a really interesting way to solve a particular problem while she was digging through some PhD thesis documents for an unrelated project. Paper was written in 1974, 30 years before the technology even existed to solve this problem. It was a fascinating read and she just might be onto something. When it comes to JLA and my bookworm partners, we will read the stuff you send us. The smarter we can be ahead of time, the better. Step Three: Face to Face (1) This is the first meeting where the meter starts running. Up until this point, it really doesn’t count. It is this meeting where we’ve agreed you are starting the process to raise capital from my firm. This meeting will usually last an hour or so. I say, or so, because I try to leave enough room for the unexpected as well as making sure you feel comfortable that when it b done, it b done, you don’t have to stick around. You are going to tell the story and I’m going to listen. Really. It is not that complicated. You talk, I listen and then we have some dialog with questions, give -n- take, etc. Don’t put up with these cocky jerks who think they know more then you because they get to be in the VC office. Don’t accept rude, condescending, treatment. You are working hard on growing a company and that fact alone, affords you respect. I try to follow my partner, John, who has a great habit. During a presentation, he asks if it is okay to ask questions. Simple, polite behavior and, more often then not, it blows people away. Just tell me the story and let’s talk about it. There are common questions that will always come up so you might want to consider doing a first (i.e. I’ve never seen it); create an Investor FAQ. It could consist of these (and probably other) questions:
This isn’t a long, painful, power point deck, rather a simple list of the obvious questions that pretty much everybody is going to ask. At the end of this meeting, I am likely to tell you that I will speak to my partners and get back to you with a go forward yes or no, typically, within 48hrs. If I know for a fact that this isn’t for us, I will tell you on the spot. If you’ve read the web site, asked around about me, know what we do, etc, you’ve probably got a good shot at peaking my interest. I’m new, like you, am growing a brand, like you, and work hard, like you, to make my business successful. Hopefully, we can do it together. Step Four: The Huddle (1) At JLA, we have an open office concept. Cubicles, if you will. We do that to insure we all know what’s going on as well as keeping a good buzz around the office. Nothing kills cooperation and teams faster then private offices with doors. Leaving that debate for another day and moving on; we will chat about your idea during that 48hr period. We think about the market, the space, our collective expertise, the docket of pending deals, and the general first pass, collective gut check. Assuming nobody reaches for a barf bag and the partner driving the deal is still keen, we move on to step five. If it dies at this point, you will get a phone call or email. The jury is out on which style is better. I think a rapid response phone call is more personal then email while others thing getting out the email quickly beats telephone tag every time. In the end, speed is the issue. I try hard not to waste your time. It’s just a bad thing for everybody. I take it as a supreme compliment when an entrepreneur recommends me to another entrepreneur after I’ve said no to their idea. This tells me, loud and clear, that respect for you and your time is appreciated. Step Five: More info (1) I try to do as much work as I possibly can before issuing a term sheet. It’s the worst thing in the world you can do or have done to you, it being having a term sheet pulled. I’ve been on both sides of that table and nothing, regardless of the reasons, hurts more then having that paper killed. To combat this, we try hard to get as much information as we can so that when we give you a term sheet, it is as far down to the legals and reference checks as possible. We’ve made the call to do it, now it’s the pesky details. Others toss term sheets with no shop clauses, break fees, and other silly things and that’s fine for them but not for my partners and I. During this phase, we provide a checklist of the items we’d like to see before making the call on a term sheet and valuation, etc, etc. The checklist we provide list the materials you will likely have to have regardless of who funds you so we try to make this request work you will do anyway and work you only have to do once. You are, of course, free to decline on some or all of those things and we will make the call on what we have. A term sheet with less data is likely to have issues with valuation, structure, etc, but we can serve the customer as best we can. If you are interested in what those checklists look like, drop me a line or come by; I’ll be happy to share this data with you. It’s important to note that we will say no as fast as we can if there is something that doesn’t check out or there is a serious problem which impacts our basic thesis. This is the place where “good business but not for us” is reasonable so long as we get you that feedback quickly and with a minimum of pain. It’s also important to note that we will issue a term sheet if we think something is interesting/good before completing all the work. I just strongly recommend you think twice about insisting on a term sheet before you know if the party is really interested in your business. Get all your materials together, let them review what they need and make that term sheet count. Step Six: Face to Face (2) You and your team will be invited back to our office to meet our entire team. This is basically an opportunity for you to present to our whole group and give everyone a chance to meet and greet. We are pretty laid back about this but we want you to know everybody. It’s the best part of the process, actually. You get to meet some really smart people who, by this point, are really interested in you, your team, and your ideas. Step Seven: The Huddle (2) The JLA team huddles and we spend time going over what you’ve presented. The lead partner on the deal, along with an analyst, will present the basic thesis again, opportunities, a standard SWOT (Strengths Weakness Opportunities Threats) chart, and we will debate the deal to determine the value and structure of a deal. We usually will make the term sheet call at this point and begin the process of getting a term sheet out the door or somebody will have found a major flaw/problem that, if not resolvable, will kill the deal. Either way, we communicate this to you quickly. Step Eight: The Term Sheet At Last! We will issue you a term sheet with fairly standard terms and one that matches what we’ve talked about prior to the paper being transmitted. The single more important suggestion I can give you is to negotiate this document and take your time! Do not fall into this silly trap of being told, aww hell, its non-binding, don’t worry about it. Get that term sheet as detailed as you possibly can and have every business term that matters to you spelled out and agreed to before you sign it. Why? Money. You will save a small, well large, fortune in legal bills if you get the business terms clearly spelled out now, before the lawyers go at it. In addition, you will get a very very clear feel for your ‘partner’ and how they act. Don’t let the lure of a term sheet cloud your judgment. Don’t be afraid and don’t listen to ‘we don’t do that’, ‘it’s standard’ or any other stuff we toss at you. Dilution might very well be the solution but make darn sure that it is on business terms that make sense to you. Again, take your time. Work out your employment agreement. Work out the option plan. Work out shareholder rights, minority shareholder rights, etc, etc. Read Brad Feld’s term sheet series if for no other reason then he gets standing ovations for showing up late to dinner parties, in jeans and a t-shirt. Plus he is all old now, you know, 40, yowsa. Step Nine: Validation It’s numbers and crunching time. We ensure there is agreement on the plan, agree on what will need to be spent, the basic metrics, and where we can add the most value quickly. During this time we are also continuing to refine the business terms we’ve collectively laid out in the term sheet so we can turn a business list over to lawyers for legal language not a legal debate on our mutual objectives. This is additional face time between you and I as another checkpoint for both of us to get to know each other. Step Ten: The Huddle (3) Our team gets together for a third time to talk about our findings with respect to the final plan, milestones, people, terms negotiated, etc. It’s the time where we ‘sign off’ internally before we head to serious legals. At this point, my partners have had lots of time to review the opportunity, maybe play with the service/app, look at the competition, etc, and just continue to get smarter about the space. It should be noted that along the way, we usually provide the feedback to you. You will notice we forward items of interest from blogs, news clippings, etc, just to make sure we are on the same page and seeing the things you see. Hopefully, we are already adding value to your team by seeing things you may be missing. Step Eleven: Legals Crank up the lawyers and roll out the paperwork. By this point, we should be ‘there’ from the perspective of ironing out legal points that have been translated from the business issues we have agreed upon. The smoothest part of the transaction or the nightmare from hell with no middle ground is how this step gets classified by me. Nothing kills a deal faster then both sides going off track with respect to legals. Actually, nothing kills the working relationship faster, is probably the more accurate statement. On the VC side, there are many things which you can assume are going to be required prior to closing. A no material change clause, for example, or a rep and warranty with respect to ownership of intellectual property is likely going to pop up. On the start up side, you are going to be looking for things to be defined like “for cause” or “best efforts” or “to the company’s knowledge”, etc. All of these things are in the domain where the lawyers look out for the client’s best interests. My advice at this step is twofold. First, common sense and reality rule the day. This applies to both sides. There is always a business agreement that is the basis for the legal translation. I find it very helpful that when a sticking point comes up, the business people (you and I) simply agree on the business principal and then, with both lawyers in the room, give instructions to ensure the translation is carried out, no free lancing. Make the two lawyers work it out and do that as a team. The second point is risk management. There is risk in everything. If you believe I’m going to steal your company, we shouldn’t be past step zero. If I believe we need eighty layers of protection because there is some question about you, again, we shouldn’t be past step zero. We either want to do a deal or we don’t. I know that sounds silly but, in the end, it really will be that simple. Give on points that, in the end, will be the least of your problems. This applies to both sides of the equation. Step Twelve: Final Approach We have a last review of the details, the agreements, put some beer in the fridge, coin in the box, and get cracking! If you’ve lasted this long, and I know it was painful, thank you. I hope this long entry will help you get a feel for how at least one firm, ours, operates. Drop by. Canada is always open for business, we’ll keep a light on. 05/11/2007 给投资人看什么?浓缩介绍What should I send investors? Part 1: Elevator Pitch.by Venture Hack "Summarize the company's business on the back of a business card." Summary: An introduction captures an investor's attention, but a great elevator pitch gets a meeting. The major components of the pitch are traction, product, and team. If you're building an interesting company, people will offer to introduce you to investors—it makes them looks good. In Hollywood, content is king; in Silicon Valley, dealflow is king. So, what should you send investors? Send an elevator pitch and a deck. We'll cover the elevator pitch in this article. Get a first meeting with an elevator pitch.A great elevator pitch is more important than your deck and less important than the "introducer". If you don't have an introduction, the elevator pitch is critical to a cold call. An introduction sells the investor on reading the elevator pitch, which sells the investor on reading the deck, which sells the investor on taking a meeting. Many investors will just skim the deck and take a meeting if the introduction and elevator pitch are good. An elevator pitch.Send a brief email that the introducer can forward with a thumbs-up. I crafted this elevator pitch from Marc Andreessen's job listing for Ning:
Your email should be no longer than this example (which is already too long). Dissecting the elevator pitch.Let's dissect this pitch:
See David Cowan's excellent Practicing the Art of Pitchcraft for more examples. 04/11/2007 别人的钱Other People's Moneyby Matt McCall "There's only one thing I love more than money. You know what that is? OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY. " I haven't posted in a while as work has been absolutely chaotic as the pre-Thanksgiving rush has begun. Start-ups, acquirers, partners are all pushing to close transactions before our business begins to wind down in the Thanksgiving to New Years period. I am up in Wisconsin with my son who is getting one last golf tournament of the year in. The aptly named "Intimidator" tournament has a steamy 40 degree wind chill, 17 mph winds and light rain. I elected not to walk the course with the other parents in his group for some reason. So, I can catch up on some posts here… A friend of mine sent me a question I thought warranted a post. He was wondering how VC's viewed a) founders investing their own capital in the early rounds and b) founders raising money to pay themselves normal salaries. Pre-bubble, VC's preferred to see the founders have a significant portion of their net worth tied up in the deal. This aligned interests and kept the entrepreneur focused. Nothing like a mortgage to encourage strong commitment to a deal. However, as top deals became more competitive and successful entrepreneurs built up sizable nest eggs, entrepreneurs began to push back on the notion and embraced the OPM (other people's money) philosophy. They were committing time and giving up opportunity cost to pursue the venture. What more could a VC demand? Most VC's, while preferring to see financial skin in the game, are focused more on the quality of the team, the market and the deal terms. Additionally, true entrepreneurs are driven by a core desire to make a difference (and notch a win) so monetary sticks add only incremental leverage (though more so in downside scenarios). Most entrepreneurs will take the middle ground. They will choose to bootstrap the business through proof of concept (site launch, etc) and then push for funding. Often they will self-fund or use angels so as to increase valuation when the larger capital comes in. On the salary front, VC's are not fans of entrepreneurs who raise capital and then turn around and give themselves $200,000 salaries. Knowledgeable entrepreneurs also usually don't do this since this is expensive, dilutive capital they have raised. They are taking significant dilution in order to gain incremental salary. If the deal is successful, every early dollar will turn into $15-25 worth of foregone equity at the exit…ouch! So, it is a bit of an IQ test from the VC's perspective. Generally, the entrepreneur passes and takes a $60-100,000 salary early on and moves this up once the company is more mature. Some entrepreneurs are forced to take in larger salaries to pay the bills at home. This is not a great situation from which to start a business. I counsel friends thinking of starting a company to make certain they have (preferably) cash equal to two years worth of personal expenses saved up. This way, they can focus on the business and not on the wolves at the door. Today, VC's aren't as focused as in the past on how much cash the entrepreneur has sunk into the business. We would still view it as a strong positive, but the realities of the market have pushed this term down the list. However, I would highly recommend that they start with a nest egg, bootstrap their business and use new capital predominantly for infrastructure and new hires. |
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